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On Some Realisms most Realists don’t like
T his paper
1 is not founded on a solid statistical survey among realist
philosophers regarding the question of which forms of realism
they don’t like. Being a speculative philosopher, I of course refrained
from doing any such scientifically respectable but tedious investiga­
tions. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the forms of realism I will
subsequently address are indeed forms of realism most realists don’t
like. I suspect that the reader will agree with me.
1 A shorter version of this paper was presented at the symposium “Philosophical
Realism and the Central European Tradition”, March 26-29,1999, University of Texas
at Austin.
Let me make the point of this paper clear from the start. It is not
simply to enumerate and describe realisms that are for the most part
found unattractive even by realist philosophers; the point of the paper
is to probe the question of what good philosophical reasons, if any,
there may be for rejecting the realisms normally disfavored by realists,
especially if considered in comparison to the philosophical reasons
that are adduced for accepting the forms of realism realists normally
favor. Such good philosophical reasons will be found wanting^ and
therefore there are only two alternatives for the realist: either to be­
come even more a realist than before, by also embracing the forms of
realism hitherto repudiated, or to altogether cease being a realist, by
also repudiating the forms of realism hitherto embraced, and to join
the camp of the anti-realists and skeptics. These two alternatives are
dictated by two possible reactions to the lack of philosophical justifi­
cation for opposing the dislike of some forms of realism to the favor­
ing of other such forms: for either all of these realisms are “good” or
all of them “bad”; hence it is not justifiable to consider only some of
them "good” and the others "bad,” or vice versa.
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1.
Before turning to particular forms of realism, a general characteriza­
tion of positions of realism is in order. Let it be controversial whether
it is an objective fact that the kind of entity F is non-empty.
Then a person x  is an ontological realist with respect to the kind of entity F if
and only if x believes that it is an objective fact that some y  are E
And ontological realism with respect to F is the position held by anyone who
is an ontological realist with respect to F, qua ontological realist.
Here an objective fact is considered to be something that is not a figment of
the mind, not a model, not a linguistic construction, not a fiction of any kind;
it is something given, something which is encountered by us, not made up,
abstracted or projected. Note that an objective fact may concern subjective
occurrences. If a person is in pain, then it is an objective fact that he or she is
in pain.
A person x is an epistemological realist with respect to the kind of entity F if
and only if x  is an ontological realist with respect to Fand moreover believes
that human beings have at least some knowledge — justified true belief —
which is individually about at least some entities that are F.
Epistemological realism with respect to F is the position held by anyone who
is an epistemological realist with respect to F, qua epistemological realist.
According to definition, being an epistemological realist (with respect
to F) implies being an ontological realist; but it is possible to be an
ontological realist without being an epistemological one. One can be­
lieve that it is an objective fact that some y are F without believing that
any human being has any knowledge which is individually about some
entity that is F. A famous case from the history of philosophy is Kant’s
being an ontological realist with respect to “Dinge an sich,” while not
being an epistemological realist with respect to them.
Ontological realism without epistemological realism with respect
to the same kind of entity F implies no contradiction and does not
render the belief-system of the realist who is thus disposed — we may
call her a Kantian realist — inconsistent. However, the Kantian realist
will find herself confronted with the question how she comes to be­
lieve that some y are £  when she is not believing that any human being
has any knowledge which is individually about some entity that is F
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— a question that, for some -For other, may prove hard to answer.2 In
view of the normal equivalence in assertability of ontological realism
and epistemological realism, the phrase "realism [or: realist] with re­
spect to the kind of entity F” is here always to be taken in the single
sense of “epistemological realism [or: realist] with respect to the kind
of entity F.” Finally, a realist simpliciter is a person who is a realist with
respect to at least some kind of entity F where it is controversial
whether it is an objective fact that some y  are F.
2 But notice that there is nothing particularly unreasonable about believing that
there are flowers nobody has ever thought of, without believing that human beings
know anything which is invidually about some flower nobody has ever thought of.
2.
The question posed to the Kantian realist brings us to the general
question how the realist justifies his realism. What arguments does he
adduce to justify his belief that it is an objective fact that some y  are F
and that human beings have at least some knowledge about some en­
tities that are F? There is indeed a schema of justification that is applied
in very many instances. It runs as follows:
There is a set of objective facts involving entities of the kind G —  the G-facts
—, and i f  there are certain objective facts involving entities of the kind F, then
they provide an excellent possible explanation for the G-facts. Hence, with
high probability, there are indeed these objective facts involving entities of the
kind F —  the F-facts, and they in fact explain the G-facts —, and in particular
it is an objective fact that somey are F. Moreover, since human beings know
quite a lot about the G-facts, they also know, via this knowledge and in view
of the explanatory nexus between the T-facts and the G-facts, at least some­
thing about some entities that are E
This schema — the so-called Inference to the Best Explanation —  is,
for example, employed in justifying the form of epistemological real­
ism that is virtually every realist’s darling: scientific realism —  the
thesis that, as a matter of objective fact, there are unobservable physi­
cal entities and that those are the objects, indeed the main objects, of
scientific knowledge. In the case of scientific realism Inference to the
Best Explanation has certainly its greatest psychological force; what
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its rational force is, is, however, notoriously a matter of controversy.
The anti-realists and skeptics insist on the radical position that it is in
no case rational to employ it, even if there were purely objective crite­
ria for something, X, being a good, excellent or best possible explana­
tion of something else, B. If, however, the value of a possible explana­
tion is more or less a matter of personal taste, then one does not have
to be an anti-realist and skeptic in order to consider Inference to the
Best Explanation with good reason an unconvincing form of argu­
mentation. Undoubtedly people very often believe something, X, be­
cause they find it to be a good, excellent, or best possible explanation
of something else, B. But what could be the force of this reasoning if,
from the objective point of view, one possible explanation for B is as
good as any other?
3.
I do not aim in this paper to criticize Inference to the Best Explanation,
which indeed is and has been of paramount importance for the meta­
physical ventures of mankind. I will merely point out the problem that
most realists are unjustifiably selective in applying this form of argu­
mentation. They welcome its employment in establishing certain
forms of realism, whereas they reject its employment in any attempt
to establish other forms of realism, although the latter forms of realism
are compatible with the former, and although, considered from an
impartial point of view, Inference to the Best Explanation serves the
latter forms of realism just as well as the former. On the contrary, they
usually even affirm the negations of the realisms in question. This casts
doubt on the metaphysical rationality of most realists: apparently they
have from the start certain prejudices on what there is not which no
inference to the best explanation, or any other argument, is allowed to
shake.
Of course, most realists will deny this charge; they will flourish
Occam’s Razor —  the methodological instrument in metaphysics
which is the reductive counterpart of the ampliative Inference to the
Best Explanation; they will assert:
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The realisms in question are rejected on the basis of Occam’s Razor: It is not
needed as an objective fact that there be entities of the kind E Therefore it is
not an objective fact.
Unfortunately, Occam’s Razor can be used to eliminate everything
Inference to the Best Explanation can be used to introduce. Why then
is Occam’s Razor applied in some cases, and not applied in others
where it could also be applied? For who says we absolutely need any
particular explanation which on the basis of Inference to the Best
Explanation leads us to believe in the objective existence of a certain
kind of entity? We can very well do without that explanation, however
cherished by us. No bridges will collapse, no planes crash. For the
anti-realist, indeed, even scientific realism is a mere result of the incon­
tinent desire for metaphysical explanation, of that intellectual vice
which is the mainspring of all error and futility — a vice which, as the
anti-realist is happy to point out, could be overcome without any
detriment at all to the technological blessings of science that constitute
in large measure what is considered to be its success.
One does not need to be as radical as the anti-realist to see a prob­
lem in the de facto application of Inference to the Best Explanation and
Occam’s Razor. Let me recapitulate and bring the difficulty into
sharper focus: Some forms of realism are accepted by most realists on
the basis of Inference to the Best Explanation, although these forms of
realism could also be rejected by them on the basis of Occam’s Razor.
Other forms of realism are rejected by most realists on the basis of
Occam’s Razor, although those forms could also be accepted by them
on the basis of Inference to the Best Explanation. Can these goings-on
be rational ?
The truth could very well be that with respect to the considered
forms of realism most realists have indeed firmly entrenched posi­
tions. But these positions are not based on argument, not on Occam’s
Razor or Inference to the Best Explanation, which are a mere garnish
used to fill, in a thousand modifications and refinements, books, pa­
pers and conference discussions — a pageant revolving endlessly on
the question whether some kind of entity or other can be “dispensed
with” or “not dispensed with,” as if our theoretical needs, our hunger
for explanation or our desire, however deep, for an ontological desert,
could determine what there is and what there is not. Rather, the posi-
tions on the considered forms of realism are determined exclusively by
an intricate interplay of psychological and sociological causes’, philo­
sophical reasons are inessential.
Let us hope that this is not the truth. But becoming more consistent
in the application of our philosophical reasons and arguments in the
question of which forms of realism should be accepted, which reject­
ed, would certainly help to dispel the impression that, in fact, it is the
truth.
4.
What I have said so far is rather general and non-concrete. It is time to
move on to examples. Two of the most prominent forms of realism are
realism with respect to universals and realism with respect to states of
affairs, the belief that it is an objective fact that there are properties and
relations and that we have some knowledge about them, and the belief
that it is an objective fact that there are states of affairs and that we have
some knowledge about them too. Realism with respect to universals
has been with us for a very long time (ever since Plato); in contrast,
realism with respect to states of affairs is more or less a development
of the last two centuries. Both realisms have gained considerable pop­
ularity among realists in recent times, since they are considered to be
natural annexes to scientific realism, which is, as I have said above,
practically every realis t’s darling. In view of this, it is not amiss to point
out that one can be a good scientific realist without being any sort of
realist with respect to universals or states of affairs. After all, the enti­
ties a scientific realist avows to objectively exist — subatomic particles,
photons, electromagnetic fields, etc. — are individuals, and therefore
neither universals nor states of affairs. Protestations to the contrary
notwithstanding,3 *5 it seems to me that the source of both realisms — of
realism with respect to universals and realism with respect to states of
affairs — is natural language, not natural science.
3 Cf. Da v id  Ar m s t r o n g : Universals and Scientific Realism. Instead of a detailed
documentation of majority opinions among realists, the influential philosopher David
Armstrong will here serve as the typical realist, representing the majority of realist
philosophers.
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More specifically, natural language, of which the language of sci­
ence like the language of philosophy is a mere technically modified
outgrowth, abounds with prima facie instances of singular reference
to universals and states of affairs. Can all these apparent instances of
reference be in fact “mere names,” flatus vocis as the nominalists would
have us believe? No; the best explanation of the ubiquitous apparent
reference to universals and states of affairs in natural language is that
there are indeed objectively given universals and states of affairs there
to be referred to, and it is natural to add that they are indeed in many
cases referred to successfully and become objects of objective knowl­
edge. We are not required to believe that every apparent instance of
singular reference to a universal or state of affairs is a real one; of
course not; neither is every apparent reference to an individual a real
one. But the phenomenon of ubiquitous apparent reference to univer­
sals and states of affairs can hardly be accounted for on the basis of
denying any objective ontological basis for it.
Here we have a classical example of founding forms of realism by
applying Inference to the Best Explanation. The anti-realists con­
cerned, the nominalists, will of course fail to be convinced and charge
that all that makes the realist with respect to universals or states of
affairs believe in universals or states of affairs is simply his irrational
will to believe in them. No, for the nominalist, simply no explanation
can be good which is based on universals and states of affairs and
which jettisons his cherished ontological parsimony. The nominalist
will, therefore, offer elaborate arguments which via paraphrastic elim­
ination of names are designed to demonstrate the dispensability of
universals and states of affairs in the semantics of natural language; if
needed, he will offer arguments that are intended to demonstrate the
dispensability of universals and states of affairs wherever else they
may be thought to be necessary; he will — ultimately, as it seems —
conclude, invoking Occam’s Razor, that there are no objectively given
universals and states of affairs.
For an impartial spectator, it is difficult to drive away the feeling
that in the whole debate realist and nominalist are merely rehearsing
in so many words what they — for whatever cause, but in the end
beyond any argument pro or contra- believe, respectively disbelieve
in. In any case, the arguments on both sides are likewise logically
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inconclusive. The skeptic, indeed, will sarcastically point out that it is
a remnant of a magical world view to hold that names call forth enti­
ties, and that it is likewise such a remnant to hold that ceasing to name
something will make it disappear. But like Cassandra, nobody believes
a skeptic.
It is an addition to the above picture of the magical power and logical
weakness of metaphysics that most realists with respect to universals
or to states of affairs unaccountably turn away from Inference to the
Best Explanation to nominalistic strategies and Occam’s Razor in or­
der to reject, while sticking with their realisms, stronger versions of
these very realisms. They want to be realists with respect to universals
or to states of affairs all right, but not all the way. Specifically, they
reject Boolean realism both with respect to universals and to states of
affairs; hence, while believing in objectively given states of affairs, they
disbelieve, in fact deny, that there are, as a matter of objective fact,
negative or disjunctive states of affairs. Ostensibly as a reason for their
denial, they will argue at great length that such states of affairs can be
dispensed with.
This is curious and less than consistent, because the case for nega­
tive and disjunctive states of affairs is, on the basis of Inference to the
Best Explanation, just as good as the case for states of affairs in general.
Let me illustrate: Suppose an investigator has come to believe that the
murder in house B was committed either by the gardener or by the
butler. The investigator has also come to believe that the murder in
house A was not committed by the gardener, but by the butler. This
little story strongly suggests the following ontological interpretation
of it, or explanation of the singular references occurring in it: The
investigator is related in the same manner, by the relation of belief, to
three different entities: (1) to the entity that the murder in house B was
committed either by the gardener or by the butler, (2) to the entity that
the murder in house A was not committed by the gardener, and (3) to
the entity that the murder in house A was committed by the butler.
Now it is admitted that it is an objectively given state of affairs, per-
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haps even an obtaining one, that the murder in house A was commit­
ted by the butler. Is it in any manner plausible to deny that the first
"that”-phrase and the second also refer to objectively given states of
affairs? No; but if these “that”-phrases do thus refer, then it is an
objective fact there are negative and disjunctive states of affairs (and
certainly we know something about them, or about appropriate sub­
stitutes for them: nothing hinges on the examples chosen).
This is a trite little argument, but nobody to my knowledge, has
answered it satisfactorily, that is, without presupposing from the very
beginning that there simply are no negative and disjunctive states of
affairs and without immediately retreating into the citadel of total
skepticism: the claim that analogy proves nothing whatsoever, that
apparent reference is no indication whatsoever of real reference, that
we absolutely have to be seriously impressed by the possibility (al­
though a mere insubstantial conceivability) that the apparent objects
of belief may not be the real objects of belief.
The argument can be strengthened by adding to the story that the
investigator neither believes that the murder in house B was commit­
ted by the gardener nor believes that it was committed by the butler;
he is entirely undecided in the question which one of the two did it.
This immediately blocks the possibility of reducing the investigator’s
apparent doxastic relatedness to a disjunctive state of affairs to his
doxastic relatedness towards either of the two state of affairs which
disjunctively constitute that state of affairs. One might claim that the
investigator’s belief in a disjunctive and also in a negative state of af­
fairs can in some other way be adequately redescribed in such a manner
that neither an apparent reference to a disjunctive nor to a negative
state of affairs occurs in it. Ontologically, success in an endeavor to
produce such a description would conclusively prove nothing: not
mentioning something simply does not show that it is not there. And
I rather doubt that success is possible; in very few cases, if any, one can
adequately redescribe an act of mind which seems to be about some
object (seems so most of all to the subject of that act of mind herself)
as not being about that object at all. As a rule, the redescription misses
entirely the quality of intentionality that is characteristic of the act of
mind it is purported to be an adequate description of. Try to adequate­
ly describe Jim’s thinking of Vienna without any reference to Vienna.
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It is at least as difficult, I submit, to describe the investigator’s believ­
ing that the murder in house B was either committed by the gardener
or by the butler without any reference to the state of affairs that either
the gardener or the butler committed the murder in house B.
6.
What I have said concerning Boolean realism with respect to states of
affairs, can be mutatis mutandis also applied to Boolean realism with
respect to universals. A realist with respect to universals has no good
reason to disbelieve in negative and disjunctive universals. If apparent
reference to universals is, as this realist believes on the basis of Infer­
ence to the Best Explanation, not always an illusion, why then should
apparent reference to negative and disjunctive universals always be
such an illusion? I fail to see any plausibility in this.
For natural language abounds with instances of apparent singular
reference to negative and disjunctive universals as objectively given
entities, and so does the language of science. Consider the property of
not being electrically charged, a negative property which certain sub­
atomic particles have as well as the atom itself, and which, it seems to
me, is completely on a par — ontologically and epistemologically —
with the proper property of being electrically charged. But consider in
turn this latter, prima facie so very respectable property, which some
other sub-atomic particles have, but not the atom itself, and what one
finds is that it is indeed no other property than the disjunctive prop­
erty o f being either positively or negatively electrically charged. Yet
does being disjunctive reduce in any manner the ontological status of
being electrically charged, does this make a non-entity out of it? I fail
to see any reasonable point in defending such a position for someone
who is a realist with respect to universals.
As negative and disjunctive states of affairs can be believed in, so
negative and disjunctive properties can be intended to be acquired or
kept. If Jim who is not a father intends to be a father, which property
is Jim intending to acquire by taking appropriate measures? The
straightforward answer is: the property of being a father. And if Jack
who is not a father intends to be not a father, which property is Jack
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intending to keep by taking appropriate measures? The equally
straightforward answer is: the property of not being a father. But this
is a negative property. What is Jack intending to keep if there is no such
property? I don’t know of any good answer to this question. Is he
intending to keep the property o f not having the property o f being a
father? But this does not help, since the newly introduced property is
also negative. Is the entire description of Jack’s situation simply mis­
leading, and is, more correctly speaking, Jack who is not a father sim­
ply not intending to be a father? But not intending to be a father is
clearly something else than intending not to be a father. The enemies
of negative properties had better not tell us that both phrases mean or
ought to mean the same.
In turn, if Jim who is neither eating a banana split nor a cheesebur­
ger intends to eat a banana split or a cheeseburger, which property is
Jim intending to acquire? The answer is: the property of eating a ba­
nana split or a cheeseburger. But this is a disjunctive property. What is
Jim intending to acquire if there is no such property and if, as we may
suppose, Jim, being undecided, is neither intending to eat a banana
split nor intending to eat a cheeseburger? Again, I do not know of any
good answer to this question.
7.
But let me turn to another form of realism which most realists despise
for no good reason: realism with respect to the non-existent — the
thesis that, as a matter of objective fact, some entities do not exist and
that we have at least some knowledge which is individually about
some entities that do not exist. In fact, many realists believe that real­
ism with respect to the non-existent is a logical inconsistency. The few
friends of the non-existent have taken considerable pains to point out
that “to be an entity” and “to exist” need not necessarily mean the
same, that it is legitimate to take “to be an entity” in the sense of “to
be an object,” and “to exist” in the sense of “to be actual [or real],” that
there is no logical inconsistency involved in the thesis that some ob­
jects are not actual. This seems only reasonable, but their efforts have
not been to much avail. The reason is clear: once one admits that there
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is a legitimate interpretation of “some entities do not exist” in which
this sentence is not a logical inconsistency, then it becomes difficult,
and indeed very difficult for a realist with respect to universals or
states of affairs, to defend the falsity of this sentence under any legiti­
mate interpretation. But this falsity is precisely what the inveterate
enemy of the non-existent absolutely wants to hold on to, hardened
in his ontological prejudice, unreachable for any argument to the con­
trary.
Let me illustrate. Suppose we have a realist with respect to univer­
sals or states of affairs but who is a firm anti-realist as far as non­
existent entities are concerned. Let this philosopher, in a moment of
weakness, accept that “some entities do not exist” can be legitimately
interpreted as a logically consistent sentence, in the way just indicated,
to mean as much as “some objects are not actual.” He will then have
to give up his opinion that there are no non-existent entities in what­
ever acceptable sense. For certainly there are both non-actual states of
affairs and non-actual universals.
Being a non-actual state of affairs is as much as being a non-obtain­
ing state of affairs, a state of affairs that is not a fact, that is not the case.
And there are lots of states of affairs that do not obtain, that are not
facts, that are not the case. For example, that the moon is a planet of
the sun is, indeed as a matter of objective fact, a non-obtaining state of
affairs. And therefore there is, as a matter of objective fact, at least one
non-actual object, and hence, according to at least one admittedly
legitimate interpretation, there is at least one objectively given non­
existent entity.
Similarly, a non-actual universal is a universal that is not exempli­
fied by any actual objects. And there are lots of universals that are not
exemplified by any actual objects. For example, the relation of perfect
human love is not exemplified by any actual objects. And therefore,
again, there is, as a matter of objective fact, at least one non-actual
object, and hence, again, we may legitimately conclude that there is at
least one objectively given non-existent entity.
In view of these arguments our realist with respect to universals or
states of affairs and anti-realist with respect to the non-existent may
be imagined to quickly revoke his concession that “some entities do
not exist” can legitimately mean the same as “some objects are not
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actual.” But being a self-respecting philosopher, he will presumably
think of a “better” reaction: he will not revoke his concession, but
deny that the singular designator “that the moon is a planet of the sun”
and the singular designator “the relation of perfect human love” do
indeed refer. Indeed, in every case where he is confronted with the
apparent naming of a non-actual object, he will deny that an object is
named at all. His sole reason for this is that if an object were named in
any of these cases it would be — horribly — a non-actual object,
whereas it is the rock of our realist’s ontological faith that there are no
non-actual objects because there are no non-existent entities.
Yet is it plausible to deny that the name “that the moon is a planet
of the sun” and the name “the relation of perfect human love” do in
fact refer? If they do not refer, what then is the belief of a child about
who believes that the moon is a planet of the sun? What then is the
effort of two people guided by who try as much as possible to realize
within their relationship the relation of perfect human love? For it
seems to me undeniable that the belief of the child is indeed about
something, and that the effort of the two people is indeed guided by
something (by a causa finalis, as the scholastics say). What else could
this be than the non-actual state of affairs that the moon is a planet of
the sun in the first case, and the non-actual relation of perfect human
love in the second?
8.
To give an argument for the non-existence (or non-actuality) of some
individuals may seem to be somewhat more difficult than to give one
for the non-existence of some states of affairs and universals. But I, for
my part, know that I might easily not have existed: if my mother and
father had never met, and that easily somebody else could have existed
in my place: if it had not been, accidentally or for whatever reason, my
turn to be conceived and born into my family, but Kerstin^. Call her
“Kerstin” — this woman who could have existed in my place. Kerstin,
certainly and as a matter of objective fact, does not exist. Hence it is
an objective fact that there is at least one individual that does not exist.
And although Kerstin does not exist, there are quite a few items that
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are known individually about Kerstin, and not all of these merely
concern what could have been; for example, it is known that Kerstin
is a human being, that she is female, that half of her genes come from
my mother’s, and half from my father s side, and that she is, therefore,
in many respects similar to me, as sisters are to brothers, that the only
chance she had to exist was also my only chance to exist, etc.
Thus much about Kerstin in particular. In general, if everyone of us
exists but might not have existed, why reject that some people — some
known quite well by us — might have existed but do not exist? The
refusal to believe this involves a strange, unsatisfactory asymmetry
between contingent existence and contingent non-existence: whereas
the occurrence of the first is admitted, the occurrence of the second is
rejected. O r should we, instead of admitting both, contingent exist­
ence and contingent non-existence, reject both ? But this position lacks
plausibility. Is it in the slightest degree plausible that everyone of us
exists necessarily, that it is impossible for us not to have existed? I do
not find this plausible at all.
Let me point out, before leaving realism with respect to the non­
existent, that it is an inconsistent triad to hold (1) that everything
exists, (2) that it is not contingently the case that everything exists, and
(3) that something might not have existed. Enemies of the non-existent
usually hold on to (1) and (2); this forces them to conclude that every­
thing exists necessarily —  contradicting metaphysical common sense.
If, on the other hand, they do believe that at least they themselves or
some part of themselves — say, a certain tiny hair on their head —
might not have existed, that is, if they hold on to (1) und (3), then they
have to conclude that it is merely a contingent fact that everything
exists; it might have been otherwise. This is a very uncomfortable
position for them, for they are then confronted with the task of ex­
plaining this strange metaphysical contingency: that everything exists,
although it could have been the case that something is non-existent.
Can this be an accident? Hardly. But if not, what is its explanation?
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9.
Most realists are scientific realists. On the basis of Inference to the Best
Explanation they conclude that there are indeed, as a matter of objec­
tive fact, tons of electrons, neutrons, photons, and what not. Nothing
much wrong about that. But consider now that most realists go on to
believe that, basically, there are also no other individuals but electrons,
neutrons, photons, and stuff like that. That is, from scientific realism
they proceed to physicalism4 Scientific realism does not imply physi­
calism; there is no logical necessity involved in the transition from the
one to the other, since scientific realism does not logically exclude
certain other forms of realism, which physicalism certainly does ex­
clude. Nevertheless most scientific realists are physicalists.5
4 Note that physicalism is a thesis about individuals. It is compatible with realism
with respect to universals, or sets, or states of affairs, etc. In fact it is often combined
with one or the other of these realisms. Cf. BRIAN ELLIS in “What Science Aims to
Do,” p. 170.
5 Cf. “What Science Aims to Do,” p. 170: “We can isolate a number of strands in
the thought of scientific realists, apart from those already mentioned; and perhaps it
will be useful to do so, for most scientific realists see them as going together as a
package deal. Firstly, there is a commitment to a physicalist ontology.”
The step from scientific realism to physicalism is made by them,
broadly speaking, on the basis of Occam’s Razor — or so they pre­
tend. They had better simply assert their basic belief that there are no
non-physical individuals, which is a respectable metaphysical posi­
tion, and let this be the end of it. For from the logical point of view, it
is very shaky business to base anything on Occam’s Razor. In some
cases it is in fact much more problematic than to use Inference to the
Best Explanation to establish the contrary conclusion. Let me illus­
trate this by considering another form of realism most realists nowa­
days don’t like.
10.
If one believes that it is an objective fact that there are psychical indi­
viduals which are not physical, and that at least something is known
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individually about at least some of these entities, then, applying our
definitional schema for forms of realism, one is what may be called a
Cartesian realist. Cartesian realism — it is not quite the same as Car­
tesian dualism, but is certainly implied by the latter — once ruled the
roost; nowadays it has fallen into utter disfavor with most people who
are otherwise realists (with scientific realists, with realists with respect
to universals, with realists with respect to the non-existent). It has, in
ever larger quarters, become a matter of intellectual pride to profess
materialism and to spurn Cartesian realism. But I find the intellectual
zeal frequently shown in waging philosophical war against Cartesian­
ism less than rational. There is an unphilosophical touch of fanaticism
to it. Contrary to the widespread enthusiasm for a so-called anti-Car-
tesian revolution, for the ultimate liberation of mankind from the
Dark Ages, it seems to me that Cartesian realism is at least as well-
founded as any other form of realism. The following argument is in­
spired by Thomas Nagel et al.
It is undeniably an objective fact (not constructed, not a model)
that we experience sensations, feelings, thoughts, perceptions. These
are psychical individuals. But sensations and feelings do not appear to
be physical, although they frequently revolve around something phys­
ical; neither do thoughts and perceptions appear to be physical, al­
though, of course, their objects often are. Rather, all these psychical
entities undoubtedly appear to be non-physical. Now the best expla­
nation of the unquestionable non-physical appearance of psychical
individuals is that they are in fact non-physical] for the most appropri­
ate conception of the essence of psychical individuals is that in their
case appearance and reality coincide, that, qua psychical individuals,
they necessarily are as they appear to be, and appear to be as they are.
Therefore, as a matter of objective fact, there are psychical individuals
which are not physical, and who would doubt that a lot is known
about them individually?
In order to fight this argument, the physicalist must draw into
question what Descartes discovered: that the essence of psychical in­
dividuals is as described; he must argue that even in the case of psychi­
cal individuals — of sensations, feelings, thoughts, perceptions — ap­
pearance and reality can fall apart — that is, fall apart with respect to
the bearer and subject of these entities, to whom they appear.
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This is a somewhat desperate move; for how, for example, could a
sensation of mine be otherwise than it appears to me (appearing, for
example, non-physically) ? But the physicalist does not stop here; he is
not a skeptic who merely wants to surpass Cartesian skepticism and
to doubt what Descartes said cannot be rationally doubted: that ap­
pearances (or cogitationes} qua appearances are as they appear to be,
and appear to be as they are. No, he does not merely doubt this, but
denies it, and in addition he claims to know what the true nature of
psychical individuals is: science, in its greatness, has revealed their
essential physicalness to him.
O r so he says; what science has in fact revealed to him, to an ever
greater extent, is the correlation between psychical and physical indi­
viduals. It is one step further— not a step within science, but already
a metaphysical step, presumably made in the name of Inference to the
Best Explanation — to consider this correlation to be non-contingent.
Yet even a non-contingent correlation between the psychical and the
physical does not imply that the psychical is essentially physical. Al­
gebraic numbers, for example, are non-contingently correlated with
natural numbers in the strictest possible sense: one-to-one and analyt­
ically; but of course no algebraic number is or could be essentially a
natural number.
This did not give any pause to the physicalists. They went on to
apply that great instrument of ontological surgery that in the name of
parsimonious reason cuts away everything that is unnecessary: Oc­
cam’s Razor; they used it to excise an utterly unnecessary, and unrea­
sonable difference indeed: that between correlation and identity', cor­
related entities were made to be identical entities, and therefore', every
psychical individual is essentially physical. Gottlob Frege, alluding to
Leibniz, once sarcastically praised the fruitfulness of the Principle o f
the Non-Distinction o f What is Different for the philosophy of arith­
metic.6 The philosophy of arithmetic did not remain its only field of
application; the Principle — of course not under the compromising
name Frege had given it, or under any other name — was made to be
the cornerstone of materialist metaphysics; and it still is, although
presently it has rather become a principle o f blurring as much as possi-
6 See FREGE, “Über die Zahlen des Herrn H. Schubert.”
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ble the distinction o f what is different by the endless incantation of
“supervenience” and “emergence.” From the point of view of reason,
it would certainly be better not to base materialism on some perver­
sion of Occam’s Razor; better simply to profess it as a deeply felt
metaphysical creed. For this is what materialism may well come down
to.
11.
And not only materialism. As I have suggested above, quasi-religious
primitive beliefs, that are caused in some way or other, but not based
on reason, may well constitute what ultimately powers anyone’s tak­
ing a stand on any metaphysical issue. Inference to the Best Explana­
tion, Occam’s Razor — both may well be mere alibis (but from the
logical point of view, highly problematic alibis), adopted in order to
assuage critical reason, most of all the critical reason of the believers
themselves. This is a strong suspicion; for how else can it be accounted
for that applications of Inference to the Best Explanation are unfairly
made out to be “bad,” although, to the impartial observer, they are just
as good (and as bad) as the ones that are considered to be “good”?
How else can it be accounted for that obviously bad applications of
Occam’s Razor are praised as the apex of enlightened reason?
Let me present one last example of a realism most realists don’t like
to underscore the force of these skeptical questions. If one believes
that it is an objective fact that there is precisely one divine being7 and
that at least something is known which is individually about this be­
ing, then one is what can be called a monotheistic theological realist.
Now theological realism is a kind of realism most realists turn away
from in disgust if it is suggested as a reasonable and defensible position
in philosophy. But this revulsive reaction, in its turn, does not appear
to be reasonable itself, although it is of course understandable in view
of the development of western thought in the last 500 years, which
7 Divinity is traditionally held to include: actuality, personhood, omnipotence,
omniscience and perfect goodness, in addition — less centrally — unchangeability and
simplicity. For what follows, the first four attributes are crucial.
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tends to promote antagonism between a religious and a scientific so­
cialization.
Why does the said reaction not appear to be reasonable? This needs
some elaboration. We observe regularities in our world, some of which
we, extrapolating what we observe, believe not to have failed in the
past and not to fail in the future. This belief is not based on reason, but
as David Hume has pointed out, on blind trust. However, as I have
said above, nobody heeds the skeptic, and therefore we have to live
with the following astonishing bit of philosophical inconsequence that
sums up the state of mind most philosophers are in with respect to
induction: “Yes, yes, of course, we all know what Hume has said; he
is right; but never mind: it is beyond reasonable doubt that there are
regularities in this world that never fail.”
The phenomenon of never-failing regularities in this world, pre­
sumed to be well-established, then cries out for explanation. Now
consider the following possible explanation of this phenomenon
which most realists consider to be a good one: the never-failing regu­
larities in this world occur because they are objectively necessary; they
are the consequences of so-called laws of nature.
This invites the following comment. It is of course a very good
possible explanation of any phenomenon to say that it is objectively
necessary, that things could objectively not have happened in any oth­
er way, i f  such an explanans could in fact be true. But it cannot be true
that the never-failing regularities in this world are objectively neces­
sary. For as Hume has persuasively argued, the only objective neces­
sity is conceptual necessity, and the conceptual necessity of the never-
failing regularities in this world is completely out of the question: they
certainly are not conceptually necessary (but “contingent”). The
friends of natural necessity will tell the skeptic that the regularities in
question are supposed to be objectively necessary in some primitive,
irreducible sense. Unfortunately they fail entirely to provide any elu­
cidation of this sense. Please note that it is not a definition that is asked
for, but merely some clarification of the idea of necessity invoked. In
order to provide such clarification it is really not helpful at all to
maintain that the supposed objective necessity of the (supposedly)
never-failing regularities in this world is grounded in various cases of
one universal objectively involving or implying (“necessitating”) an-
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other universal, that this is what a law of nature amounts to;8 for this
objective involving or implying cannot be of a conceptual nature (like,
for example, being yellow conceptually implies being extended), or
else the necessity of the never-failing regularities in this world would
be a conceptual one, which it isn’t. Then, which not merely factual
implication or involvement of one universal by another other than a
conceptual one is meant by the friends of laws of nature? I have no
idea, and I suspect, following David Hume, that, assertions to the
contrary notwithstanding, nobody else has any reasonably clear idea
of the intended relation.
8 Cf. ARMSTRONG: What is a Law of Nature?
In any case, believing in natural necessity, and in laws of nature as
its basis, because their existence would well explain the never-failing
regularities in this world, is, for an impartial observer, certainly no
better than believing in God, whose existence as the sole divine being
would certainly explain these regularities at least as well (providing
also an explanation of why they appear to us to be in some sense
objectively necessary and yet contingent: the will of God is indepen­
dent of our wills, and his decrees, while contingent, are for us human
beings incontrovertible).
12.
Thus monotheistic theological realism is seen to be no worse than
realism with respect to laws of nature and natural necessity, and it is
puzzling why the latter realism is embraced, the first rejected (and
even negated). Either to refrain from both or, if not, then to accept
monotheistic theological realism seem to be the most reasonable reac­
tions (since one cannot well accept both realisms as an explanation of
the never-failing regularities in this world, and because the theological
realist has a somewhat clearer idea of what she is believing in than the
realist with respect to laws of nature and natural necessity).
But of course, most realists won’t react in either of these two man­
ners at all. For them, it is an incontestable principle that any (possible)
explanation that invokes the existence of God is bad, indeed very bad\
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any explanation, on the contrary, that does without the existence of
God is, for this very reason, an explanation with considerable merits;
at least it has acquired the right to be respected and scrutinized.
Reason, most realists say, must do without God. Some of them do
indeed question why this must be so, and give the answer that reason
— or in other words, philosophy — must in accordance with Occam’s
Razor do without God, because science can do without Him; for the
purposes of science, God is an “unnecessary hypothesis.” But leaving
aside the question whether the needs of science, and nothing else,
should be absolutely mandatory for philosophy, it is undeniable that
science can do just as well without laws of nature and natural necessity.
Therefore, by applying Occam’s Razor, one can conclude, by parity of
reason, that philosophy must do without laws of nature and natural
necessity. With “laws of nature” I do of course not mean what one can
find, printed in bold face, in science textbooks; I do not mean New­
ton’s Laws or Boyle’s Law, not such sentences and not the regularities
described by them, but the metaphysical hypostases which are sup­
posed to be the foundations of these regularities, somehow imparting
to them a non-conceptual contingent necessity. No scientist, who is
not at the same time a metaphysician, needs these hypostatic laws of
nature for anything in science or in private life, whereas he may indeed
need God, at least in private life. Laws of nature, in the metaphysical
sense, are needed only by metaphysicians, and by some of them, it
seems, for the sole purpose of fighting supernaturalism which they
consider to be a pernicious error of mankind.
13.
I have arrived at the end of my survey of realisms most realists don’t
like. I mention in passing that modal realism is a special case of realism
with respect to the non-existent, which I have treated in some detail.
I have not talked about moral realism, which is outside the realm of
theoretical philosophy strictly speaking. But let make the general
comment that moral realism, just like the widely despised realisms that
were to some extent considered in this paper, is a form of realism
which would deserve a less unjust treatment by realists, if it were
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regarded by them from the point of view of a fair use of the method
for founding forms of realism, Inference to the Best Explanation, and
of a fair use of the method for dismissing them, Occam’s Razor. Justice
or, in other words, methodological balance would require that there is
greater uniformity in the realists’ attitude towards the plurality of
possible realisms: they should not over critically reject (negate com­
pletely or to some lesser degree, or observe skeptical neutrality with
respect to) certain realisms, while accepting uncritically certain others;
this is the main general point which I have attempted to drive home in
this paper. Only by observing a greater methodological balance in
metaphysics it is at least to some degree reasonable to suppose that the
results of applying Inference to the Best Explanation and Occam s
Razor are indeed bits of knowledge.
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